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It requires about thirty-five minutes to read the Constitution of
the United States. To read and digest the decisions of the courts
construing the Constitution, and the treatises and miscellaneous
books which have been written upon it, would exhaust at least five
years. Every section of the Constitution is so incrusted with
decisions that the original text is almost lost sight of, just as the
sides of a house are hidden when they are covered from top to bot-
tom with a bounteous growth of creeper vines, and one cannot say
whether they are brick or wood.
It is helpful and necessary for the bench and bar, now and then,
to remove the thick coat of adjudications which incase the Consti-
tution and to look at the naked text of that great document in its
original form.
The Constitution of the United States is a perfect piece of politi-
cal architecture. It is not only beautiful and symmetrical, as a
whole structure, but its departments are so arranged that, while
distinct and separate from each other, they communicate by wide
doors through which a healthful and vigorous interchange of views
can be constantly established between them. The three depart-
ments,---the Executive, Legislative and Judicial,--although form-
ing part of the same political establishment, are separated from each
other by broad and distinct lines. Each constitutes a perfect system
within itself. The authority and scope of each branch of the gov-
ernment are plainly marked out, and the functions of the officials
who are charged with work therein are clearly defined. This great
edifice, although it has already received so many encomiums, is, in
political architecture, nondescript. It has no prototype. It is sui
generis. It is a union of States, existing by virtue of written arti-
cles of association, which define its purposes, clothe it with the
powers necessary for carrying them into effect, and give healthful
and perpetual vigor to the same, leaving the constituent States with
all their original force and authority, except that part conferred
upon the central government. The consideration for this political
pact is full and reciprocal. The powers drawn from the States
nourish the Federal Government, and, in return, it guarantees
security and protection to the States, home and abroad. The ele-
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mentary or fundamental principle of a federation is, as put by one
writer: "To combine a number of independent communities into one
whole without destroying, on the one hand, the independence of the
several States, or limiting, on the other, the effective force of that
body." Another learned author reiterates this view in different
language: "On the one hand, each of the members of the Union
must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each
member only; on the other hand, all must be subject to a common
power in those matters which concern the whole collectively."
No government, based upon a written constitution like ours,
could exist without a branch or department to which is committed
the right to say whether a statute is authorized by the letter or
spirit of the basic contract. This important function is committed
to the judiciary, and its jurisdiction and general scope of powers
are clearly set forth. Necessarily, the judiciary is not only vested
with the function of declaring whether a certain act is warranted,
or transcends the Constitution, but it must, to be effective, have the
power to execute its judgments through the instrumentality of its
marshals and posse comitatus which may, if occasion demands,
swell into the whole military force of the country.
Hamilton wrote, in the Federalist, of the judiciary: "It may be
truly said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment, and
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm, even for
efficacy of its judgments. . . . It proves incontestably that the
judiciary is, beyond comparison, the weakest of the three depart-
ments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the
other two, and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to
defend itself against their attacks." Montesquieu supports this gen-
eral view. Whether the judiciary has substituted its will for its
judgment, or whether the remarks I have quoted were abstract
thoughts and not applicable to the Federal Government which had
been created, or whether conditions originally existing have abso-
lutely changed, or whether one or all of these facts measurably
co-operate to produce the result, there is now only a theoretical
truth in this opinion of these great men. The Supreme Court of the
United States has gradually and naturally, but not by usurpation,
risen to the highest pinnacle of power, and, by having the last word,
it has overruled statutes without stint, and defeated, on many occa-
sions, the combined will and judgment of the legislative and execu-
tive departments of the government, for the latter together make
the law. And this result is a necessary one, for if the decrees or
judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States should be
arrested, or deflected, by legislative or executive interference, the
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wheels of the government would instantly stop, and confusion worse
confounded would exist in our midst. Happily, there has never
arisen any open conflict between this court and the other two
branches of the government, although many fierce battles of words
have ensued over its decisions, and although at -times some bitter
criticisms have been made by Federal officials, legislators and others,
as to the result produced by the particular judgments of that court.
John Randolph, for example, as his historian puts it, wrathful
beyond measure over the failure of the impeachment of Judge Chase,
"moved, on the spot, an amendment to the Constitution that 'all
judges shall be removed by the President on the joint address of
both houses of Congress;"' but the suggestion fell dead, almost
as soon as it was born. There has always existed a trait in the
American character which teaches absolute submission to official
results, and no sooner is an election decided, or a judgment of a
court, especially of the Supreme Court of the United States,
announced, than the feeling of loyalty to our institutions swallows
up political and individual disappointments, and produces general
acquiescence.
The distinguishing, perhaps a weak feature, of our government,
is that we have a written Constitution. Of course, this is inevitable,
because the terms of the political association must be laid down in
black and white. The misfortune, however, is that this gives rise
to disputes as to the interpretation of the words and sections of the
Constitution. Men and parties, differently situated, interpret the
instrument differently. It is said that when a cow looks on the
grass, it is white. So each individual is apt to put a construction
upon the Constitution which agrees with his present prejudices and
interests. And this gives rise to manifold controversies which pro-
duce uncertainty if not confusion. The language of the Constitu-
tion becomes submerged under different interpretations. Hence,
frequent recourse to the original document is healthful. The Con-
stitution prescribes that all Federal statutes and State Constitu-
tions and laws shall be subordinate to the Federal Constitution.
Every law must respond satisfactorily to this requirement, and pass
through the sieve of the Supreme Court of the United States. If it
cannot meet this test, it is thrown out of the body of laws and is
henceforth worthless. The plan of the Constitution is that the Acts
of Congress must not conflict with that instrument, and the Consti-
tution and laws of the different States must not disagree with either
the Acts of Congress or the organic law of the United States. The
final burden of the work of interpreting the Constitution of the
United States has been thrown upon the Supreme Court; and since
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its organization it has been continuously engaged in endeavoring
to expound the meaning of the words used therein. Consequently,
there has grown up a vast body of judge-made constitutional law,
which has, in some instances, enlarged, and in others, restricted the
popular or historical meaning of the text. The legal tender decisions
are an example of the former, and the income-tax cases of the latter
class. Unhappily, too, in the contests, both political and economi-
cal, which have been under review in that court, there has crept
into the decisions, prevailing and dissenting, much sophistry, incon-
sistency and doubt. So frequently have National and State itatutes
been challenged as unconstitutional, that the laws passed by the
National and State Legislatures, inspire very little respect. They no
longer carry with them moral weight. No strong presumptions of
constitutional legality surround them, and hence, they are all assailed
with impunity. The lawyers make no bones in attacking them, and
the names or character of the legislators who pass the laws are not
even known or inquired for. This condition of affairs does not
exist in Great Britain. There the Acts of the English Parliament
are supreme. When laws are passed by that body, they are not
tested by any other written law or constitution. They are not forced
to pass through the crucible of a constitutional test to prove that
they are invalid. In England, the courts, at most, are called upon,
and not frequently, to interpret the meaning of the Acts of Parlia-
ment. This avoids a vast amount of work by the English Bar,
which is thrown upon American lawyers, and, in passing, it is well
to observe that the effect upon the American Bar of these frequent
disputes over the meaning of the words of the National and State
Constitutions has been to produce a class of advocates whose argu-
ments are principally remarkable for subtle and metaphysical dis-
tinctions, and whose conclusions are very often, through a process
of labyrinthine and clouded reasoning, strained,, inconsistent, or
unsound. In England, on the other hand, the forensic arguments
are free, simple, natural and logical.
These suggestions of elementary principles prepare the reader
for some observations which I shall make upon the effect which our
great commercial era has had upon the development of Constitu-
tional law within the last four decades.
Keeping in view that the purpose of the Judiciary Department
is to preserve the Constitution in all of its pristine vigor, that is to
say, that it is a guardian charged with the trust of maintaining in
form and spirit the federation which was formed by the Union of
the States, against all attempted encroachments, external or internal,
it may be truthfully said that down to this point the Supreme Court
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of the United States, through all the vicissitudes of National poli-
tics and history, has faithfully, fairly, and substantially, tried to
perform its full duty. But it must also be observed that for the
last forty years all the courts, both Federal and State, have been
far from happy. They have entered upon a new era in constitu-
tional history, caused ,by the marvelous commercial developments
which began in this country after 1873. Questions of a commercial
and economical character have been thrust upon them by legislation,
many of which properly belonged for regulation to the parties con-
cerned,or to financiers and political economists. Our legislators have
often overlooked the important distinction that States and govern-
ments are not organized to enter into business, or to make contracts
for their citizens, or to interfere with the freedom and development
of commerce, except to keep the channels open and unobstructed.
Some of the legislation to which I have referred has already been
threshed out in the courts, and many decisions have been made
covering these economic subjects, but they are generally unsatisfac-
tory and unconvincing, for two reasons: first, in almost every
instance where a conflict has arisen, involving Federal or State con-
trol, over railroads, corporations or commercial industries, or dis-
putes between capital and labor, the decisions lack unanimity, the
Supreme Court of the United States generally dividing into five
to four, or six to three, and the publication of the majority and
minority opinions has shown such a divergence of views between
the judges, that all the questions probably will be, in due course,
re-argued and re-decided, or the laws upon which they are based,
repealed or modified. For instance, out of seventy-seven cases
decided between the October term, igoi, and the same term, I9o7
(i87 to 207 U. S.), in twenty-nine the court stood five to four; in
forty-five, six to three, and in three cases, five to three, one judge
being absent or not voting. Second, the cases have mostly been
decided upon technical grounds; in vain efforts to reconcile
conflicting decisions instead of upon principle. I therefore
take the liberty, in the briefest manner, of treating the general
subject de novo, and upon principle. The necessities of commerce
brought into existence within the last fifty years a vast number of
corporations, some with large and some with small capital. It may
be said without the risk of reasonable contradiction, that it was im-
possible to conduct our colossal industries unless through these artifi-
cial bodies. Individual capital, and individual effort, separate or
joint, were positively inadequate to meet demands. The reasons are
obvious. Let it suffice that no individual had the necessary money, or
if he had, would not invest it in one colossal enterprise. With the
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growth of corporations, and the enormous investments of capital, in
the various business enterprises, the demands for labor, and the
demands of labor palpably increased. Labor kept full pace, with the
rapid march of industrial progress, both in respect to the character
and time of employment and as to its remuneration. Out of these
conditions the plan was conceived of merging many firms or corpo-
rations conducting similar businesses, into one company. These
aggregations were soon baptized as "trusts." For instance, fifteen
separate co-partnerships or corporations, with an aggregate capital
of ten millions were amalgamated into one new body politic, with
a capital of fifty millions, and the shares listed on the Exchange and
promiscuously sold. This operation frequently repeated produced
billions of dollars in share capital, which, in due course, was quickly
distributed and absorbed by the public. Instead of these businesses
being owned by a few manufacturers, they thenceforth were
owned by thousands of investors. Suddenly, there appeared
in the country, as if by magic, a class of men who, by one means or
another, had acquired immense individual wealth, soaring far into
the millions. The people seemed to have been stupefied by the com-
bined spectacle of colossal individual fortunes, enormous aggrega-
tions of capital, and the increasing demands of labor, and without
a profound study or accurate knowledge of conditions, the cry arose
for legislation. Everything was thrown hotch-pot into politics, and
it became fashionable to decry trusts and attack capital, whether
invested in industrial or railroad enterprises. The State of Illinois
led off, in 187o , by opening up in its Constitution (which was fol-
lowed by an act of the Legislature in i87) the subject of regulating
warehouses where grain was held and inspected. The Munn case
was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1876,
and this legislation sustained. In this case, in upholding the act,
it was decided that the limitation by legislative enactment of the
rate of charge for services, rendered in a public employment, or for
the use of property in which the public has an interest, established
no new principle in the law, but only gave a new effect to an old
one; and in answer to the argument that this was an attempt at the
regulation of commerce, the court held that warehouses for the
sorting of grain may incidentally become connected with interstate
commerce, but not necessarily so; that their regulation was a thing
of domestic concern, and certainly until Congress acted in reference
to their interstate relations, the State might exercise all the powers
of government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly
operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. There-
with was a long dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Field, concurred
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in by Strong, J., which closed with this language: "No reason can be
assigned to justify legislation, interfering with the legitimate profits
of that business, that would not equally justify an intermeddling
with the business of any man in the community, so soon, at least, as
his business became generally useful." This case has twisted itself
like a snake through the Federal courts, and has been freely used
by both sides in the same litigation. From that time down, the
courts, Federal and State, have been engaged with questions of a
cognate character, the effect of the Munn case having been to whet
the appetite of the law-makers for this kind of legislation. Then
Congress finally entered the field and the Interstate Commerce Law
was the result. At the time of its passage, it was purely a specula-
tive undertaking, of doubtful propriety and constitutionality. I had
an interview with Jay Gould, in reference to the Bill. It may not be
known, but it would have been easy, by perfectly legitimate means,
to have defeated it. Jay Gould, with his hand constantly on the
pulse of public sentiment, said: "Let it go, or we will get a worse
dose next season." But the extraordinary powers vested in the
Interstate Commerce Commission were handled dexterously, deli-
cately and prudently by the Commissioners, and the business inter-
ests of the country became, in time, used to it, and have now practi-
cally acquiesced in the existence of the Commission, as a part of
the railroad'system of the country. After an eel is skinned once, it
is said he does not feel the second operation. But in passing I am
forced to state that so long as railroads were built, owned and
operated by private capital, the subject of placing them in the charge
or under the supervision of a public Commission was, upon principle.
capable of being seriously questioned. Especially as the common
and statute law gave full redress against all invasions of the rights
of the public. A commission to inquire would have been infinitely
preferable to a commission with power. But the Federal courts
swallowed the law without a grimace; the raison d'etre and ultimate
effects and consequences upon republican institutions were not con-
sidered. The crowd seemed to be yelling for laws against railroad
corporations. A conflagration started in a 'hay mow is hard to
stop, and a fire again broke out in Congress over trusts, and the
Anti-Trust Act was the result. The fact that our highest offi-
cials are clamoring for an amendment of this act is all that need
be said in criticism of this law. It is as ignorant and hastily
devised a piece of legislation as was ever inflicted upon the country.
It was the result of pure partisanship--one political party seeking
to outdo in speed and apparent solicitude for looking after the inter-
ests of the country, its opposing political enemy. The subject of
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so-called "trusts" was a new one. Its influence upon business and
the welfare of the people, for good or for evil, unknown. It was
legislation aimed at a ghost, which nobody had ever seen, but which
had been fluently and flippantly talked about by irresponsible politi-
cians and demagogues. I have seen no argument or discussion yet
which shows that a corporation with a capital of ten million dollars
is harmless, while one for one hundred millions is detrimental, unless
it is monopolistic in its true sense. What is the limit of corporation
capital? And who is to fix it? All corporations are trusts-in the
sense of having aggregated capital. Moreover, this anomalous
result is now seen by an inspection of our statutes: that corpora-
tions are invited to be formed with perpetual charters and unlimited
capital for which handsome license, franchise and other fees and
taxes are paid into the exchequer of the States, and yet, alongside,
in the same chapter, are ranged laws punishing persons who form
trusts as criminals! After the Anti-Trust Act, other National and
State legislation followed in favor of, not against, labor, although
the labor unions had been steadily increasing in size, strength and
influence. The hours of labor were measured, and throughout the
length and breadth of the land, either by laws or through the instru-
mentality of labor organizations, a policy of dictation was pursued,
which was intended to fix byabsolute rule all of the relations between
the employer and employee. Of course, only the technical side of
most of these great questions were threshed out in the courts; but
they eventually appeared in one form or another, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the acts were assailed generally
on the ground that they violated the Constitution of the United
States, and especially the Fourteenth Amendment. They were
sought to be sustained sometimes upon the ground of police power,
but generally upon the ground that they came within the commerce
clause of the Constitution. And a pitched battle was raged between
the Fourtentht Amendment on the one side, and the commerce
clause of the Constitution, on the other, neither of which, in my
humble judgment, was ever intended to cover such conditions! It is
a fact, too, worthy of notice, that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were a part of the reconstruction policy of the Republi-
can party, and none of the Southern States were admitted to the
Union until after they had unconditionally agreed to adopt them, the
Fifteenth Amendment being then in process of becoming a part of
the organic law. This Fourteenth Amendment, passed for the pro-
tection of blacks, by the construction of the Supreme Court of the
United States, became a flaming sword, protecting all the rights of
property from invasion by any State in an effort to deprive any per-
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sons of life,liberty or property without due process of law, or to deny
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. I
find no fault with this construction because the broad language of
the amendment justified it. I am alluding simply to its history.
The soil upon which the rough and tumble legal battles, arising
out of commercial relations, of which I -have been speaking, were
fought, was the commerce clause of the Constitution. That little
sentence of sixteen words: "To regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes,"
it was argued, covered almost every apparent or alleged need of
the public, until it has come to be regarded as an open sesame by
legislators for all constitutional problems. Where the devices of
necessity, convenience or public clamor could find no refuge under
any other clause of that great instrument, they were sought in this
little clause. When a murderer had finished his bloody work, in the
days of early England, he sought refuge from punishment in a mon-
astery. So the advocates of laws against trusts or corporations, or
in favor of labor, point to the power to regulate commerce as one
which furnishes an excuse for every conceivable regulation that a
false, ephemeral sentiment demands. If commercial development
is to be restricted, if labor is to be regulated, if the rights of employer
and employee are to be adjusted, if many of the most ordinary
affairs of businesg are to be arranged, the Federal legislator quickly
seeks the deep and illimitable caverns of the commerce clause, where
by the magic words of public sentiment, the doors are unlocked and
he finds spread before him a table groaning with all the delicacies
of sophistry, and of long dissenting opinions, which fill him with
inspiration to compound new Federal statutes to suit the needs of
paternalism or socialism.
Now let us recur to the commerce clause of the Constitution,
looking at it quite apart from the decisions of the Federal tribunals
of forty years, and keep in view the purposes of the federation, to
see if it is capable of being stretched to suit, to speak mildly, the
public sentiment or opinion of the hour. It seems to me that there
can be no doubt as to the meaning of that clause. Most certainly
the framers of the Constitution never dreamed of the commercial
conditions which now exist, and that is most apparent from reading
the statement of the purposes of the commerce clause, in the
Federalist:
A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which
import and export through other States, from the improper contributions
levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade
between State and States it must be foreseen that ways would be found out
to load the articles of import and export during the passage through their
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jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter, and
the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that
such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by
that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceas-
ing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the
public tranquility. To those who do not view the question through the
medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial state to col-
lect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors,
must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the
injured party by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient
channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the
cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before
public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity
for immediate and immoderate gain.
The words, "regulate commerce," seem to mean to keep it free
of obstructions. Because a stage-coa6h runs from Vermont into
the borders of an adjoining State and the proprietor and his driver
live in the first named State, does this give Congress the power to
impose new liabilities upon the employer in favor of the employed,
not contained in the contract of hiring? Why should the govern-
ment intervene in such affairs? Does the commerce clause, using
the. words, "to regulate" commerce, give Congress authority to put
into the hands of Federal officers, the entire control of railroads and
corporations, because they pass through, or do business in different
States? To dictate their rates; the character of their equipage; the
kind, number and wages of their employees? In a word, to denude
their officers of substantially all control of these companies, built and
run by private capital, because there is a public use attached to
them?
I am not unmindful that a factor of great importance, tending
to cause the people to look to the Federal Government for relief, is
that we have forty-eight different States which are constantly and
busily engaged in legislating upon these subjects, and a business or
corporation which extends itself through all, or a great many of
these distinct State sovereignties, is apt to find a different class of
legislation upon the same subject in each different jurisdiction. As
a diamond drill passes through different strata of rocks as it bores
its way through the earth, so a railroad or commercial corporation
is apt to discover different laws in the different States through which
it passes, or in which it operates. In one State there may be a broad
and liberal policy displayed in the legislation; in another, a narrow
and bigoted system 9f control or regulation of corporations may
exist. Beyond any doubt, this is serious and embarrassing, and
many conservative citizens who, without thinking of the
ultimate consequences in the change of our government from that
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which was instituted by its founders, are willing that the whole mat-
ter of the control of commerce, corporations and labor, should be
left in the hands of the Federal Government. They do not perhaps
give enough attention or weight to the operation of natural laws
which will eventually right the inaptitudes, deficiencies and injustice
of legislation.
The truth is, the country is in the throes of a dilemma. On the
one side there exists all of these questions in respect to trusts, rail-
roads, and capital and labor, which become acute in the time of
presidential elections. Are they the proper subjects of legislation
at all? If yea, to what extent shall. laws attempt to regulate the
business questions of the country? On the other hand, there is a
deficiency in the Constitution of the United States giving Congress
full and ample power to deal with these various and delicate sub-
jects. In my humble judgment, at least, it seems so. The alterna-
tive is that there must be amendments to the Constitution. If the
people of this country think it wise to clothe the Federal officials
with power to regulate all of the questions which grow out of exist-
ing commercial conditions, they should realize that it means practi-
cally a change of the form of our government. It means a central-
ized power. It means a diminished interest by our citizens in gov-
ernment. It means the enfeebling of States, even to actual debility.
It means more. It means paternalism. Whether the governments,
Federal or State, should interfere in the general questions between
labor and capital is a serious and profound question. I think that,
generally, each should enjoy the most absolute freedom, consistent
with public good. The government upon principle has no right
to fix the rates of labor; or of its daily duration, or to secure to
employees absolute immunity from accidents. Those are matters
for private contract. At most, these are temporary shifts which
eventually increase the price of production, which falls upon the
consumer, and the laborer drinks the poisoned ingredients of his
own mixing from his own chalice. Those who suggest the limita-
tion of the hours of labor, or the fixing of its price, are the worst
enemies of the laboring class. This country has developed largely
through individual force. If laws are passed, by which ambition,
skill and energy are to be crushed, and every man, be he stupid or
bright, placed upon the same equality, the laborers will, in due course
of time, become atrophied, and the ultimate result is paternalism.
If our legislators neglect such considerations in the passage of laws,
in my judgment, it is the duty of the Federal courts to intervene
to prevent an absolute change in our government. Their function
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is changed from "expository,",after the form of Bentham, into the
"censorial" which ascertains what the law ought to be.
The questions, as I have said, are serious and embarrassing.
Hamlet boldly sought out the ghost and found it was his father's.
If we have a complete knowledge of these questions, our courts
have sufficient character, intelligence and courage to deal with them
in a way which will preserve our institutions intact. Heretofore
our legislation has been largely speculative. It has been invading
the spheres of capital and labor, and entering upon the domains of
power not given to the Federal Government by the Constitution.
John R. DosPassos.
